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Abstract 
This paper describes an intelligent propulsion control architecture that coordinates with the flight 
control to reduce the amount of pilot intervention required to operate the vehicle. Objectives of the 
architecture include the ability to: automatically recognize the aircraft operating state and flight phase; 
configure engine control to optimize performance with knowledge of engine condition and capability; 
enhance aircraft performance by coordinating propulsion control with flight control; and recognize 
off-nominal propulsion situations and to respond to them autonomously. The hierarchical intelligent 
propulsion system control can be decomposed into a propulsion system level and an individual engine 
level. The architecture is designed to be flexible to accommodate evolving requirements, adapt to 
technology improvements, and maintain safety. 
Nomenclature 
IA Increasing Autonomy 
IFC Intelligent Flight Control 
IPC Intelligent Propulsion Control 
IMM Intelligent Mission Management 
OEI One Engine Inoperative 
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Introduction 
Economic pressure on airlines and a pilot shortage (Ref. 1) are providing the impetus to reduce the 
size of the cockpit crew, and eventually remove the pilot altogether, once the idea gains acceptance with 
the flying public (Ref. 2). With the current high level of automation, it might seem like a short leap to a 
single pilot in the cockpit, to a fully unpiloted vehicle, or to a single pilot on the ground monitoring 
multiple vehicles at once. Currently, in highly automated modern commercial aircraft, pilots spend an 
average of under 7 min per flight actually flying the aircraft (Ref. 3). This hand flying occurs almost 
exclusively during takeoff and landing (Ref. 4), which is also when most accidents and incidents take 
place (Ref. 5). It should not be surprising that lack of participation in the flying process can lead to 
boredom, which can lead to a decrease in performance (Ref. 6). High profile accidents (Refs. 7 and 8) 
point out not only the loss of piloting skills, but also confusion about the automation itself (Ref. 9). 
However, pilots can also identify extremely unusual emergency situations and demonstrate tremendous 
skill in reacting to them (Refs. 10 to 12). This reveals a paradox: while most commercial aviation 
accidents are attributed to human error (Ref. 13), humans can also prevent accidents through heroic action 
that cannot be anticipated or learned through training. Therefore, any system that replaces the pilot flying 
must not only perform as well as or better than the human on mundane tasks, it must exceed the human in 
extraordinary situations, or risk that the promise of autonomous aircraft will not be fulfilled. 
Approaches to the design of such a system can be through either comprehensive automation, or 
automation that has the ability to reason about situations it was not explicitly designed to address. The 
latter approach would involve the development of sufficient vehicle self-awareness to at least replace the 
pilot’s senses when it comes to diagnosing problems. 
Autonomous operation of civil aircraft will require the propulsion control to be highly integrated with 
the flight control to remove the need for the pilot to serve as the integrator. This integration can also 
provide an added benefit of overall system optimization. Although recognition of off-nominal situations 
in the propulsion system is one of the capabilities at which pilots excel, pilot error is still cited as the 
cause of most accidents. Therefore, on-board autonomy algorithms will need to be able to recognize and 
respond to off-nominal propulsion situations even better than pilots do today. There are numerous 
examples of propulsion system malfunction plus inappropriate crew response (Ref. 14) leading to 
accidents. Addressing these situations through greater engine state awareness and better communication 
to the pilot is the initial step, with the autonomy taking on more responsibility over time. 
The specific goal here is to develop an intelligent engine control architecture that enables the 
propulsion system to work harmoniously with the flight control, with reduced pilot intervention required 
as the architectural framework is populated. It will automatically recognize the vehicle operating mode 
and configure the engine control scheme to provide optimal performance for that mode based on 
knowledge of engine condition and capability. The propulsion control will take cues from the flight 
control to operate autonomously. It enables “personalized” control of an engine, which will facilitate the 
ability to assess the current engine condition and its performance. The architecture provides an interface 
with the flight control to communicate engine capability, receive engine thrust commands, and set the 
engine into the appropriate control mode; it also enables safe accommodation of “off-nominal” conditions 
by intelligent decision making to replace decisions currently made by the pilot – such as whether to shut 
down an engine, continue operating at reduced performance, etc. Increased system integration will result 
in enhanced information that will ultimately improve safe decision making. There will be a natural 
progression from the current situation where the pilot monitors and controls the engine to a fully 
autonomous propulsion system. This approach will maintain safety and still be compatible with an 
increasingly autonomous flight control. 
The remainder of this paper consists of a description of the architecture, followed by several 
examples of the partially populated architecture implemented and operating in a simulation testbed to 
identify and mitigate safety concerns. A discussion of the examples and a lessons learned section come 
next, followed by conclusions. 
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Intelligent Propulsion System Control Architecture 
With advancements in computing and information systems technology, it is reasonable to assume that 
there will be a natural progression from the current cockpit procedures to fully autonomous aircraft 
operation. The intelligent propulsion system control architecture must be flexible enough to accommodate 
evolving requirements while maintaining safety (note that some recent accidents have been attributed to 
loss of piloting skills due to over-reliance on automation (Ref. 15)). Therefore, the types of functions 
currently performed by pilots, as well as those that would need to be performed with no pilot present, 
must be addressed. These types of functions include detecting, diagnosing (Ref. 16), and accommodating 
faults (Figure 1), and reducing pilot workload in high stress situations. They can extend to optimizing 
aircraft performance by coordinating the flight and propulsion control under certain situations, without an 
explicitly integrated flight and propulsion control design approach. An intelligent propulsion control 
architecture has been developed, as shown in Figure 2. The intelligent propulsion control comprises the 
engine systems with their individual controls at the lowest level, along with the propulsion system level 
above them. In parallel is a presumably similar, although undefined, flight control structure (this flight 
control structure should support such functionality as reconfiguration in response to a stuck actuator or 
damaged flight control surface (Ref. 17), for example). Above these two structures is an Intelligent 
Mission Management (IMM) level, which coordinates the flight and propulsion control as necessary. This 
architecture maintains the traditional roles of distinct flight and propulsion control systems as is standard 
practice today, but supports integrated flight and propulsion control as necessary to accommodate faults 
or optimize performance. Thus, the architecture is suitable for a progression from current practice to a 
more fully integrated design, as might be expected in the future. To enable this progression, more and 
more of the intelligent decision-making pilot function can be done autonomously, similar to how 
automation has assumed much of the role of flying today. 
 
 
Figure 1.—Propulsion system malfunctions and observed symptoms (from Ref. 16). 
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Figure 2.—Intelligent propulsion control architecture. 
 
The hierarchical nature of this architecture is advantageous, since it can be populated from the bottom 
up, meaning that existing subsystem and engine level diagnostic algorithms can be implemented initially, 
while higher level functions that depend on them to enable autonomous operation can be added later. This 
strategy builds on years of development of algorithms for engine health management, diagnostics, 
prognostics, estimation, and control (Ref. 18), and directly supports the concept of increasing autonomy 
(IA) (Ref. 19). Increasingly autonomous systems are defined as lying along the spectrum of system 
capabilities that begin with the abilities of current automatic systems, such as autopiloted and remotely 
piloted (nonautonomous) unmanned aircraft, and progress toward highly sophisticated systems. For the 
purposes of this work, autonomy is defined as a process that occurs without human intervention, and 
increasing autonomy means that the complexity or abstraction of the procedure increases. For instance, 
the appropriate pilot responses to a variety of engine malfunctions are defined in the aircraft flight 
manual. These checklist procedures define the sequence of steps that pilots are to follow in the event of a 
given malfunction. With IA, the engine level algorithms might help diagnose a problem, which could lead 
to execution of the appropriate checklist. Eventually, as the higher levels of the architecture are populated 
with algorithms, evaluation of the situation and reasoning about any actions that are currently up to the 
pilot’s discretion could be achieved. The distinction between intelligence and autonomy is somewhat 
blurred, but here it means that the diagnostic, prognostic, and—to an extent—accommodation algorithms 
build on and support each other to produce actionable knowledge about the engine and its operational 
capabilities (intelligence), which can be used to re-plan the mission or perform other higher level 
functions (autonomy). 
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Basic definitions of the functional blocks comprising the architecture in Figure 2 are described next. 
 
Intelligent Mission Management (IMM) 
Integrated Propulsion and Flight Control Functions 
• Control and Decision—Issues command goals to the intelligent control elements and monitors progress. 
• Automated Flight Mode Recognition—Determines the phase of flight. 
• Prioritize Flight Mission Goals—Specifies the overall flight mission objectives. 
Integrated Information Management 
• System Data—Sensor data and cockpit control setting information. 
• Aircraft Status Data—Information on the aircraft status (e.g., weight, fuel quantity). 
• Flight Data—Information on the status of the flight (e.g., vertical speed, airspeed, altitude, bank angle). 
• Mission Data—Information of the overall flight (e.g., planned cruising altitude, current flight segment, 
planned airspeed). 
Goals and Responses 
• IMM Goals—“Goals” sent from the Intelligent Mission Management level to the lower level control 
elements. These are considered goals rather than commands so that each individual intelligent control 
element can determine its own optimal approach to satisfy the IMM objective. 
• IPC/IFC Responses—Status of the goal response sent back to IMM. Provides information on whether the 
goal is achievable and its status, allowing the IMM to determine if the command goals should be 
modified to something more achievable. 
Intelligent Propulsion Control (IPC) 
• Propulsion System Level—Intelligent control level that oversees the entire propulsion system. Most of 
the propulsion intelligence resides at this level. A process continuously performs the Observe, Orient, 
Decide and Act (OODA) decision loop on the command goals for the propulsion system.  
o External System—Controls engine auxiliary output, which includes electric power generation and 
cabin bleed air. 
o Automated Recovery—Performs automated pilot check list actions for events to reduce pilot workload. 
o Situation Awareness and Evaluation—Determines situation and decides if current trends are 
desirable or if further action is necessary. 
o Data Management—Manages the data flow throughout the IPC. 
o Malfunction Detection and Isolation—Actively senses and implements mitigating actions 
(i.e., executes the appropriate checklists) for propulsion system faults. 
o Optimal Control and Actuation—Determines how the engines can be operated to achieve a desired 
goal such as increased efficiency or performance considering condition of the engines, current flight 
environmental conditions and the given flight plan. 
o Prognostics—Forecasts future propulsion system health status (i.e., life available). May estimate 
time to failure during an engine fault (e.g., time to engine seizure resulting from an oil leak). 
o Health and Status—Determines and monitors overall propulsion system health status. 
o Knowledge Base—A repository of information used by the IPC to make decisions. It can be updated 
with information that has been “learned.” 
• Engine System Level—The level is mostly an interface to the engine controller with some logic to 
enhance functionality. 
o Health and Status—Determines engine health status. 
o Control—An interface to the engine controller (Full Authority Digital Engine Control, or FADEC). 
o Sensor Data Qualification—Evaluates engine sensor data to validate that the data are correct. 
Intelligent Flight Control (IFC) 
• Function elements are TBD. 
There are multiple advantages of this architecture: pilot workload can be reduced; flight safety can be 
improved; aircraft performance can be enhanced; flight operations can be accomplished in a more 
efficient and cost effective manner; and actionable knowledge can be produced and exploited. 
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Demonstration 
Intelligent propulsion control provides oversight, diagnostics, advice, and automated responses, so it 
can work with the pilot or on its own to improve safety and performance. Knowledge of the engine state 
can be critical in emergencies because it can provide guidance for an appropriate response. In the 
Kegworth air disaster of 1989 (Ref. 20), a fan blade on a British Midland-operated Boeing 737-4Y0 
detached, resulting in heavy vibration and smoke in the cabin. The pilot misdiagnosed the problem engine 
based on an incorrect understanding of the ventilation system, and shut down the wrong engine, 
unknowingly continuing to fly on the bad one. Eventually, the damaged engine ceased operating and burst 
into flames, resulting in a deadly crash. In another example, TransAsia Airways Flight 235, a twin-engine 
turboprop, experienced an engine flameout on takeoff. The flight crew did not perform the appropriate 
failure identification procedure, resulting in confusion regarding the identification and nature of the actual 
propulsion system malfunction. The pilot reduced power on the working engine and then shut it down 
(Ref. 21). The aircraft climbed, and before the engines could be restarted, it stalled. The altitude was 
insufficient for recovery, and the plane crashed. 
With knowledge of the engine state, the preliminary implementation of the intelligent propulsion 
control architecture is able to flag engines as good/working or bad/nonworking/failed, so that a pilot-
initiated in-flight shutdown of a good engine is inhibited or at least the pilot is alerted. The following 
examples focus on situations that are easy to visualize; the underlying algorithms and their resulting 
diagnoses and actions represent only a small subset of the potential features of the fully populated 
architecture.  
Testbed 
The testbed used for evaluation was the Transport Class Model (TCM) (Ref. 22) airframe simulation 
integrated with two copies of the Commercial Modular Aero-Propulsion System Simulation 40k 
(C-MAPSS40k) (Refs. 23 and 24) engine model in the NASA Glenn flight simulator (Ref. 25). The TCM 
represents a generic, mid-sized, single-aisle transport aircraft with two wing-mounted engines. 
C-MAPSS40k models a 40,000-lbf thrust class, high-bypass ratio turbofan engine with a representative 
commercial-type controller. There have been multiple control and diagnostic algorithms demonstrated 
using the combined simulation (Refs. 26 to 28), or C-MAPSS40k (Refs. 29 to 31) by itself, so the initial 
implementation of the architecture framework was in place. 
Examples 
The examples presented below involve engine malfunctions and shutdowns, and their impact on the 
vehicle. Commercial aircraft are designed to fly safely with an engine out. Normally with both engines 
functioning, the throttles are moved together to produce symmetric thrust. When there is one engine 
inoperative (OEI), the pilot is presented with flying challenges due to the off-centerline thrust from the 
remaining engine, which affects control of the aircraft in yaw, pitch and roll. Flight control surfaces are 
designed to be large enough to counteract this imbalance, but will incur an associated performance 
penalty. Because flight control effectiveness is related to airspeed, thrust imbalance is more difficult to 
counteract when the aircraft flies slowly. At faster airspeeds, flight control authority is improved and the 
aircraft is much easier to manage. 
When there is an OEI with a twin engine aircraft, there is the expected loss of 50 percent of the 
available thrust, but there is a more significant loss of performance from the aircraft flying in an 
uncoordinated fashion. There is added drag resulting from the flight control inputs needed to offset the 
thrust imbalance, and from the drag penalty originating from the inoperative engine. These performance 
impairments must be managed as much as possible by the pilot to reduce their impact. 
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When an engine fails, it may be difficult to determine which one it is initially. Because of 
windmilling of the inoperative engine, both engines may appear to be functioning, since the instruments 
of the failed engine have readings that may make it seem as though it is still functioning. 
The above background provides some context for the following three examples. 
Propulsion System Malfunction Detection and Identification 
The first case demonstrates propulsion system diagnostics. Here, the right engine is severely 
deteriorated and cannot produce as much thrust as the left engine. This is clear from the top two plots in 
Figure 3. While the throttles are moved together to the same power settings, the estimated thrust (Ref. 32) 
of the two engines is very different, especially at high power. The third plot shows that this leads to a 
temporary declaration of asymmetric thrust, which is subsequently unflagged as power is reduced and the 
thrust mismatch decreases at about 46 s. However, a power demand increase at about 85 s again results in 
an asymmetric thrust declaration. The right engine begins to shut down at about 92 s, and the output of 
the shutdown detection logic that flags it is shown in the fourth plot.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.—Engine diagnostics demonstration. 
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Engine Shutdown Inhibition 
This second example exercises different aspects of the architecture, using the same set of simulated 
flight data as the first example, to demonstrate how a commanded engine shutdown can be inhibited 
under unsafe conditions. The logic bases safety for such an action on a minimum airspeed or height above 
ground (AGL), either 135 knots or 1000 ft AGL in this case. Here the pilot attempts to shut down the 
engine after observing the abnormal behavior in the previous example. As shown in Figure 4, the 
command is given at about 83 s, but because the aircraft is too low and too slow according to the 
oversight logic, the shutdown is inhibited until about 93 s, when the system deems that the flight 
conditions are safe. This adds a layer of protection, but can be overridden by the pilot, if necessary. 
One Engine Inoperative Vehicle Upset Recovery 
The final example demonstrates minimum control airspeed protection against loss of control for an 
engine out situation (Figure 5). In this example, the right engine goes out (at about 10 s) and the airspeed 
begins to reduce. As the speed drops below the minimum control airspeed, the rudder loses effectiveness, 
making it unable to counteract the thrust asymmetry, and the plane begins to roll into an upset condition. 
However, in this case, the good engine’s thrust is cut back temporarily to remove the asymmetry and arrest 
the roll departure. This happens a couple of times (at about 20 and 30 s), at which point the airspeed has 
increased enough due to a reduction in pitch to return rudder effectiveness allowing the aircraft to recover. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.—Example engine shutdown inhibition. 
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Figure 5.—Minimum control airspeed protection example. 
Discussion 
These examples in the previous section build on several technologies. The engine out situation itself 
is diagnosed without pilot intervention using detection logic related to specific engine variables (note that 
this algorithm operates independently of the pilot action to shut down the engine). The asymmetric thrust 
condition, meanwhile, is detected using a thrust estimation scheme. These two diagnoses confirm each 
other and, taken together, provide knowledge about the engine state, so if a loss-of-control situation 
becomes imminent, a recovery procedure is initiated. 
Previous work has demonstrated that the engine state can be used to determine to what extent engines 
can augment the flight control to help in recovery of a damaged aircraft (Ref. 33). It has been shown that 
engines used differentially and together can be effective flight control actuators (Ref. 34). Advanced 
propulsion control schemes that take advantage of unused safety margins can produce marked 
improvement in aircraft stability over that provided by traditional propulsion control in these situations. 
Furthermore, remapping commands from a damaged flight control system to the propulsion system can 
provide significant handling improvements as compared to manual throttle manipulation (Ref. 28). The 
intelligent propulsion control architecture has the potential to incorporate such engine capability under the 
right circumstances. 
Pilot checklists are used as the starting point for autonomous operation, although higher level 
decision-making is often necessary for taking an action. If the situation generally calls for an in-flight 
engine shutdown, the appropriate checklist would be executed. However, before doing so, there are 
considerations regarding the aircraft’s altitude that must be taken into account, as a pilot would, and the 
shutdown would probably not be initiated with low airspeed close to the ground as in the example above. 
Furthermore, for emergency situations, the decisions to initiate these actions could require higher level 
reasoning capability rather than predefined limits. 
Previous research has demonstrated many of the fundamental algorithms required for the architecture 
to be effective. By populating the architecture with these existing algorithms and integrating them 
appropriately, several applications of intelligent propulsion control can be readily demonstrated that 
enable reduced pilot workload, enhanced vehicle performance, and improved engine diagnostic 
capability. These applications include: 
 
• Minimum control airspeed protection against loss of control for an engine out situation 
• Estimation of unmeasured engine variables 
• Model-based engine control 
• Asymmetric thrust detection and confirmation 
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• Detection of a disconnect between the engine power level and throttle position (i.e., stuck throttle) 
• Automation of pilot checklist for engine in-flight shutdown 
• Inhibition of incorrect engine shutdown 
 
Additionally, previous implementations of integrated flight and propulsion control have demonstrated 
improved performance, including: 
 
• High crosswind landings 
• Augmentation of flight control with propulsion to compensate for stuck, limited, and ineffective flight 
control surfaces 
Lessons Learned 
The architecture is simply a framework. It displays appropriate hierarchy and interaction to offer 
guidance to the designer, but populating it is still up to the designer. The literature contains many 
examples of diagnostic and control algorithms that work well individually, so a bottom up approach is 
logical. However, the details of the integration were not always obvious. Use of multiple diagnostic 
approaches provided confidence in a conclusion, but much of the higher level functionality was still ad 
hoc. Pilots and checklists provided direction, but there are many variations on scenarios, and pilot 
experience is anecdotal, depending significantly on the details of the situation. Furthermore, rare events, 
or those having no precedent, still require a response that does not make matters worse, which is currently 
more of a philosophy than a working principle. Thus, the development of this instance of the intelligent 
propulsion control system relied heavily on combining past work that had been developed in the test bed 
system, although some higher level responses to situations were developed and refined based on testing 
(e.g., the low speed OEI example). 
It was found that the intelligent propulsion control provides significant advantages during off-nominal 
situations by improving situational awareness of the pilot and by inhibiting inappropriate crew responses 
(e.g., reducing the “startle” factor, or helping to assess conflicting information). Conflict resolution logic is 
important because the sub-elements may generate opposing diagnoses/commands, and an awareness of the 
flight phase is needed to configure the operation of the sub-elements and to properly set logic priorities. 
Conclusions 
An intelligent propulsion control system architecture that enables increased aircraft autonomy has 
been defined, partially implemented, and demonstrated on some basic scenarios. Some existing 
algorithms are included, as well as logic to tie the results together and act on them. This structure must 
still be built up to include higher level functionality that can properly take advantage of the information 
available. Safety needs to be a major concern in the design of these systems because of its relationship to 
public confidence. The placeholders in the architecture focus heavily on safety, although it is up to the 
designer to populate them. With increased integration and information availability, there is also the 
opportunity to optimize performance. The architecture is designed to accommodate types of algorithms 
that can coordinate automated, preplanned maneuvers better than a human pilot. As society moves closer 
to notional acceptance of unpiloted commercial aircraft, primarily as a cost saving measure, the issues 
addressed by the architecture described herein will become increasingly important. 
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